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Employee Theft: 10 Exposed Areas for
Review
An Original Article by J.
Patrick Murphy
Employee theft is
nearly 50% of the losses for retailers. It's a $600
Billion crime across the nation for all businesses and
growing. Employers are sometimes reluctant to discuss
this topic or even acknowledge its existence but to adopt
that approach will lead to financial disaster.
I develop loss prevention "programs".
These are designed to deter, detect, or defend the loss of
company assets. I put
programs in quotations because in most cases, most (if not
all) of the essential elements of asset protection are
already in place. There may be some comfort in having
everything compiled under one topic but the truth is that if
policy and procedure were conducted as envisioned, the
effect would be the same. With that said I am listing
10 areas that are generic to all businesses that can assist
in closing some potential gaps that would allow employees to
steal.
There is ample
research that shows that happy work place is a theft free
workplace. The person one sees at the office is
the complex result of an entire lifetime of their
environment and morals. It would be naive to think
that everyone is 100% honest, 100% of the time and people
are not likely to outwardly show any dishonest tendencies.
The three factors of theft, need, opportunity and
justification, hold true universally and we tend to judge
others by our personal standards. What motivates and
is justification for one person would pale in comparison for
someone else. Opportunity is always the key factor.
Removing that opportunity through monitoring and consistent
handling is the best way to prevent theft.
When considering a
solid approach to combating theft by employees here are 10
areas that you should consider:
-
Preemployment
screening. Enough cannot be said
about hiring quality employees.
However, as you are reviewing their resume
or application that studies show that nearly
one third of all resumes and applications
contain inaccurate information. This
could be embellishing their experience,
adjusting their dates of employment to
appear to have been employed regularly, or
leaving blank questions regarding criminal
convictions.
Read the information and then go back
through and pick through each line in
detail. Ask yourself (and then the
applicant)
-
Why there are gaps in employment?
Were they unemployed or hospitalized or
were they in jail during that time.
-
Why do they only list the year's of
employment and not, at least, the month?
-
Look at the SSN to determine if the
issuing state is reasonable. These
numbers can be checked to determine where
they were issued. If the
application says they are a life-long
resident of California, why would they
have a Florida issued Social Security
number?
-
Does the education seem reasonable?
Did they graduate around the age of 18?
Did they go straight into college?
If not, there should be employment
history for that time.
-
Are the previous employers no longer in
business? This is either a run of
bad luck or an attempt to prevent
reference checking.
Criminal Background checks are essential in
today's workplace. Access to
convictions is available through so many
public and private entities that to not
conduct one may be considered negligent if
this was not determined and that same
employee committed a criminal act.
Hiring someone with the full knowledge that
they do have convictions is an extremely
high risk. Many companies ask only for
felony convictions to be disclosed on their
applications. This too, is a risky
practice. Misdemeanor crimes such as
carrying a concealed weapon, assault,
stalking and some narcotic offenses are
pertinent to your company. A company
is entitled to know of all convictions as an
adult. Lastly, suspended sentences and
deferred adjudication ARE convictions.
They are a form of probation that required a
guilty plea. To make this clear to
applicants, a statement should be included
on the application that these types of
sentences must also be disclosed. Keep
in mind it will be rare for someone to
openly disclose a conviction therefore an
outside verification is needed.
A
final recommended method is "paper"
honesty surveys. It's actually done
either on paper or via computer but the
concept and results are the same.
These are simply questionnaires that probe
the applicants attitudes towards honesty and
ethics. They ask questions such
as "If you saw a co-worker steal something,
you would..." and then there are multiple
choice answers. They also ask drug and
alcohol related questions such regarding
having used drugs at work or coming to work
under the influence. There is also
usually a section where questions are asked
if they have ever stolen from an employer
and how much. Astounding as it may
seem, many answer yes. In fact the
results of the survey have a history of not
recommending 30% of those taking them.
While there is cost associated with this,
the value is very high as the cost of
training and turnover is greatly reduced.
-
Employee parking. Consider your
employee parking area as a point of concern
from both a security and safety perspective. We all
like to get that parking space closest to
the store at the mall but for most
businesses, those parking spaces are
reserved for clientele. There
should be a designated parking area for all
personnel and that area should be beyond the
normal client/customer parking. The
reason for this is easy: A thief has a
reduced exposure if their car is parked
closely.
Employee parking can be a thorny topic.
Concerns for their vehicle seem to subside
if they can at least occasionally, see their
car. While there are no absolutes on
this topic here are some suggestions:
-
Never allow employees to park close to
the entrance/exit. Have a
designated parking area for them
(regardless of the weather).
-
Do not allow them to park next to
loading docks or trash dumpsters.
-
Don't allow "I forgot my badge" to be a
free pass to park anywhere. Have a
procedure in place to get them where
they need to be and back that up with a
counseling program to ensure it won't
happen in the future.
-
Encourage employees to leave the
building together to reduce exposure to
criminal acts while walking to their
car.
-
Training and Awareness.
The importance of training cannot be
overstated but the variances of the methods
and the materials makes it difficult to
define the best practices here. When
someone if first hired the amount of
paperwork required is enormous.
Sometimes mixed in with the employment
papers are company policies that require
signature. To ensure that the new hire
understands the importance of these sign off
acknowledgements, time should be set aside
that is dedicated to only those documents.
At the very least, a new hire should
acknowledge through signature that they have
read and understand policy. On the
practical side, it would be best that
specific policies that are pertinent to the
employee be presented upon hiring.
Those policies and procedures that, if
violated, result in immediate termination
are also good candidates for the new hire
package.
"Training" to what ever extent it is
(classroom, OJT, video, Computer Based) is
not truly effective unless there is some
means to verify the person's level of
understanding of the material. The
argument cannot be made that because they
were there and did not ask any questions
that they comprehended the subject matter.
For many companies, initial
training/orientation is the sum total of all
personnel policies and procedures.
Changes are distributed through company
mail, email, or conference calls. It
is important that all employees have some
means of being informed of significant
policy changes. When it comes to
prevention of employee theft, awareness is
the best on going tool.
Awareness is simply reminding employees that
the company monitors for this type of
activity because it is a profit drain.
There are many ways to approach awareness.
The use of posters is probably most common
and there are many companies that design
generic versions. Meetings about
inventory control, shrink, operating
statements etc, are good platforms to openly
discuss the results of internal theft.
I saw a handwritten sign over a time clock in
a grocery store that said "If you get caught
stealing, you're going to jail." I do
not recommend this approach and certainly
think it sends the wrong message by saying
"if you get caught". Now it almost
seems like a challenge. The message
should be about losses in general and some
method of confidential communication should
be in place so anyone can provide tips on
suspicious behavior.
-
Access Control.
This is a simple objective that increases in
complexity the larger the company.
This subject concerns two specific areas:
access by employees and access by non
employees that is facilitated by employees.
External Access Control
-
Employee Access. Start your
review process from the outside in.
In other words go to the furthest point
that requires authorized access.
Authorized access can be a key, a card,
a pass code, or some other accept/deny
point. The points could be gates,
parking lots, exterior doors and alike.
Everyone has some level of approved
access. Access can be controlled
by something as simple as a door lock or
as complex as some type of biometrics.
Regardless maintaining proper control is
really a function of keeping things
current. Vehicles and people can
easily gain entry through unmanned
gates/doors by simply "drafting" (going
through after someone else before the
door closes). These are weak areas
of security.
Entering a building with a key is good
security because only that person
can/should enter. However, how
current is your key control. What
happens when a key carrier leaves the
company? What happens to the alarm
code when someone leaves the company?
The security of the security is
extremely.
TIP: If your building has a
burglar alarm that is monitored by a
central station (i.e. ADT) generally
there are mailed or on line reports
available to check open and close times.
Someone should be reviewing these
reports to determine if there are any
odd-hour entries by authorized
personnel. If someone enters the
building at 2:00AM on a Saturday, what
was their purpose. Alarm companies
will generally notify someone if a door
is opened at unauthorized time.
Check with your alarm company.
-
Non employee Access. Employee
theft does not necessarily need to be by
the employee themselves. Collusion is a
very high possibility. This is
especially true with robberies in all
business sectors. The "inside job"
is more frequent than one might
consider. CCTV as a second layer
of security will, at least, provide
possible identification of the parties
involved. Collusion can be used
for burglaries, corporate espionage,
theft of trade secrets and vandalism
(among others).
Internal Access Control.
-
Employee Access.
Once inside a building the security
should be more restrictive. The
most sensitive areas can be anything
from a vault to employee record storage
to the IT Department. Value cannot
be determined by simply assigning a cash
value to it, there are costs associated
with theft that extend far beyond the
actual property. There are
potential costs of liability, customer
good will, interruption of the business
operation, etc. If an employee
steals a laptop computer containing
business records that are not backed up,
the cost of the loss can be devastating.
In short, anywhere an employee has
access, theft can and will occur.
-
Non employee Access. The person
acting in collusion with an employee can
only have access to areas that either
have weak security measures (locked
doors propped open) or are actively
working with the employee. Getting
into a business with the assistance of
an employee is virtually risk free.
Tip: Even if you just use
locks with keys, segregate the level of
access everyone has to specific areas.
Managers and supervisors with keys have
to allow people to have occasional
access somewhere. This is annoying
to some. Their misguided remedy
may be to disable the lock or give
everyone a key by hanging it on a hook
somewhere. This makes the security
as rigid as tissue paper and defeats the
purpose. If an area needs to be
secure then limit access.
-
Postage and Shipping.
Stamps! What is the harm of using
one postage stamp to mail in my utility
payment? The company has lots of
stamps and certainly won't miss this
one! And so goes the mentality.
Do you know how much exposure you have
when it comes to unauthorized use of
postage and shipping?
Parcel theft, the unauthorized use (and
certainly nonpayment) of some method of
shipping for personal gain. The
scale of a company's mail function is
certainly a factor but all companies
face the same problem. Tight
controls, frequent monitoring/auditing,
and an absolutely defined company policy
about misuse will help reduce theft.
Keep in mind that this type of theft not
only involves the mailing of Aunt Emma's
Christmas package at the last minute but
the theft and diversion of company
product and property using the company's
own mailing function.
Account numbers for common carriers,
UPS, FedEx, DHL and others are pure
gold. Little effort is required to
ship a package if access to account
numbers if uncontrolled. The
security of these numbers is as
important as safeguarding the
combination to a safe. There are
some areas where there is a great deal
of vulnerability:
Tip: Ensure there are
frequent spot audits (scheduled and
irregular) of all documentation.
Review for similarities of addresses
that do not seem connected to the
business. In large operations,
only a database would enable complex
queries. Investment is
specialized software that can query
disparate databases that
contain data fields such as employee
addresses, relative's addresses,
emergency contact information,
names, etc (www.infoglide.com/index.htm
) would virtually be the only method
to conduct audits of this type.
Infoglide's software can analyze
relationships of information across
multiple databases to determine how
related all information is to the
target.
-
Shipping Departments. This is
the same as above but usually
involves larger packages and
carriers such as UPS and FedEx.
This area has potential for theft of
company product, especially in
retail and catalog environments, by
shipping to themselves or
accomplices. Additionally the
driver for the carrier can also be
in collusion and simply accept
packages and then drop them
somewhere along their route.
Tip: While cumbersome
and time consuming, occasional
audits should be conducted after the
carrier has been loaded. All
packages should be checked for
proper labeling and screened for
suspicious names and addresses.
6.
Expense Monitoring.
Expense accounts are often termed as
"abused" when in reality it is theft.
Expense accounts can be used in a number
of ways for personal gain, most of which
can be caught early on with proper
oversight. A supervisor should
always review submitted expenses or
monthly credit card statements to ensure
the propriety of money spent. A
paper trail needs to exist for all
expenditures and companies should
refrain from adopting policies that do
not require receipts for small dollar
amounts.
To combat possible fraud companies
should do as much direct billing as
possible and set strict limits with
those vendors as to what will be paid
for. A strict policy should be
maintained regarding improper use of
company funds and regular audits should
be conducted for all employees. A
distinction should also be made within
the policy that the supervisor's
approval signature is meant that all
items have been properly reviewed and
that they are legitimate. When
there is accountability, there is less
likelihood that a supervisor is passing
down receipts to a lower level so that
questions won't be raised on their own
reports.
Abuse and fraud through the use of
personal credit cards is also possible.
One of the most frequent abuses I have
seen is the use of a personal credit
card that awards airline mileage to book
travel reservations. The owner of
the card will almost always be
management and the reimbursement process
will need to be prompt in order to pay
the bill. Hundreds of thousands of
miles can be amassed in a fairly short
period of time.
7.
Payroll. Using the
company payroll to commit fraud is
perhaps one of the oldest ploys around.
"Ghosting" payroll means creating
fictitious employees or continuing to
submit payroll requests despite the
employee no longer working. This
also requires forgery of the endorsement
of the check so the funds can be cashed
or deposited in the forger's account.
This type of fraud is usually committed
by managers and can go undetected for
long periods of time.
Even a small company can fall victim to
this type of theft without occasional
audits to reconcile the existence of
employees. In high turn over
industries a manager could simply
postpone submitting termination
paperwork to a payroll department for
until the next person quit. This
could be considered a form of identity
theft but it is more a means to steal
cash.
Tip: Field managers should be
conducting these audits on a very
regular basis.
8. . The
Bookkeeper. The bookkeeper plays a critical role in a
business because of their skills, their
knowledge base, and their total
familiarity with the company and their
practices. These same areas can be
used with a devastating effect if theft
is involved. Even when a company
becomes large enough to move into the
stage that requires an Accounting
Department, fraud can occur.
Consider the following areas:
-
Banking. What process is in
place to ensure that revenue and
deposits are the same? What
process is in place to ensure that
the number and amount of checks and
the amount of cash equal the
receipts for the day? To steal
cash, one would simply have to delay
depositing funds. The
subsequent days the cash that was
taken would have to be replaced by
checks from previous day's business.
-
Vendor accounts. What prevents
the bookkeeper from creating
fictitious vendors and then creating
payments they receive
themselves? What prevents
intentional overpayment of a vendor
to receive a portion of the stolen
funds. What monitoring is
available to ensure that vendors do
not develop personal relationships
with critical employees.
(Note: a review of policy
regarding the receiving of gifts,
trips, ball game tickets, rounds of
golf, etc from vendors should be
conducted).
Horror Stories. A
vendor for a very large company set
out to woo the affection of the
accounts payable clerk that who
handled their account.
Eventually becoming successful the
AP clerk began charging various
locations through journal entries
for fictitious product. By
sheer coincidence one of the
locations' managers saw an unusual
charge which eventually unraveled
the case. Time to detect:
8 months. Loss: $1.2
million. Both were prosecuted
A busy realtor had an excellent
bookkeeper. The bookkeeper was
young, energetic and very
territorial about her work.
Even the realtor could not get into
the password protected files.
The realtor thought she was a gem of
an employee because she even came in
on her vacation to take the daily
deposit to the bank. She was
also efficient and had the realtor
pre sign company checks to pay
bills. The bank manager was
alerted to some odd looking checks
made out to the bookkeeper.
Since the realtor had been a long
time customer, the realtor was
notified. The bookkeeper was
creating checks to herself and
depositing at the same bank.
Time to detect: 12 months.
Loss: $267,000. Side
note: Realtor failed to conduct
criminal background check which
would have shown the bookkeeper's
prior convictions for credit card
fraud.
9.
Petty Cash.
Sometimes called a coffee fund or office
supply money, petty cash is simply an
amount of money that is used for various
small purchases. There is no "Best
Practice" as to how much the fund should
be but regardless, it must be tightly
controlled and must be used only for the
intended purpose. Petty cash funds
tend to become the "small loan
department" for lunch or other needs
when someone is short on cash. The
money goes out and an IOU is
substituted. This is not a
recommended practice as company funds
are being used for personal use.
Petty cash should be counted daily and
documented somewhere for reference.
This documentation should be audited and
the cash personally counted (with a
witness) by the person who is in charge
of this fund. The cash plus any
receipts for disbursed money should
equal the total that should be present.
Variances, over or short, should not be
tolerated.
10.
Lockers and searches.
Lockers are considered by many
employees to be "theirs" meaning there
is an expectation of privacy of their
contents and that searching a locker is
an intrusion of their personal rights.
This should not be the perception or the
rule and is simple enough to remedy.
Company policy should clearly state that
all employees and their vehicles are
subject to search. Lockers present
a challenge if employees are allowed to
use their own locks. Check with
your legal counsel as the "ownership"
issue may change if the lock itself
belongs to the occupant.
Searching lockers either randomly or for
cause can be a human resource disaster
if not handled with care, tact, and
diplomacy. Ensure your method of
search is approved by legal counsel.
Is a "search" confined only to what is
visible in the locker or does the search
allow opening of backpacks, purses, and
briefcases? Does the employee need to be
present during any search? There
is a reasonableness factor in this
element. Check with your attorney
to determine if a supervisor can be
there instead. What is the action
taken if someone refuses to allow the
search of the locker? If your
policy is clearly written, the
resolution of that confrontation is
spelled out.
Consider this question: what expectation
of privacy should an employee have while
on company property? There are
many arguments to this and policy should
be chosen and written carefully.
Throughout this paper the overriding theme is
audit. Policy and procedure without
compliance review have little or no impact
on a business. Policy and procedure
without consistent application is an open
invitation to liability.
By The Numbers:
Fraud
Statistics In The U.S.
Click here.
LPT Security Consulting © 2008
pat.murphy@lptoday.com 713.899.2402
Houston, Texas
LP Today is licensed by the Texas
Department of Public Safety
Security Consultant License DD01728 and
Private Investigations License A 15227
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